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Counterfactual Desirability
Richard Bradley and H. Orri Stefa´nsson
Abstract
The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could
have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual
and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox deci-
sion theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais Paradox. In
this paper we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey’s decision
theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world
semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive
to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability maximising. We
end the paper by investigating the conditions necessary and sufficient for a
desirability function to be a standard expected utility function. It turns out
that the additional conditions imply highly implausible epistemic principles.
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The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have
been. Suppose you have been offered two jobs, one very exciting but with a sub-
stantial risk of unemployment, the other less exciting but more secure. If you
choose the more risky option, and as a result become unemployed, you might find
that the fact that you could have chosen the risk-free alternative makes being
unemployed even worse. In addition to experiencing the normal pains of being out
of job, you might then be filled with regret for not having chosen the risk-free al-
ternative. On other occasions something different from regret explains the depen-
dence of our assessments of what is the case on what could have been. Suppose
a patient has died because a hospital gave the single kidney that it had available
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to another patient. Suppose also that the two patients were in equal need of the
kidney, had equal rights to treatment, etc. Now if we were to learn that a fair lot-
tery was used to determine which patient was to receive the kidney, then most
of us would find that this makes the situation less undesirable than had the kid-
ney simply been given to one of them. For that at least means that the patient
who died for lack of a kidney had had a chance to acquire it. In other words, had
some random event turned out differently than it actually did, the dead patient
would have lived.
This desirabilistic dependency between what is and what could have been cre-
ates well-known problems for the traditional theory of rational choice under risk
and uncertainty, as formulated by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
([1944]) and Leonard Savage ([1954]). The first example is just a simplified ver-
sion of Maurice Allais’ ([1953]) infamous paradox, whereas the latter is an in-
stance of a decision theoretic problem identified decades ago by Peter Diamond
([1967]). In this paper we use a framework based on a combination of Richard Jef-
frey’s ([1983]) decision theory and a multidimensional possible-world semantics for
counterfactual conditionals (Bradley [2012]) to explore the above dependency.
Section 1 explains the two paradoxes and why they cast doubt on a rationality
postulate, known as separability. Separability is assumed by a class of mainstream
decision theories—for which we will reserve the label ‘expected utility theory’—
including those of von Neumann and Morgenstern (where it is called Indepen-
dence) and Savage (where it is called the Sure-thing principle). Separability is
not presupposed by Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory, however: His is a theory
of desirability maximisation that is not an expected utility theory (in the vocabu-
lary adopted in this paper). This makes his theory a good candidate for handling
Allais’ and Diamond’s examples but, as we explain in section 2, the lack of coun-
terfactual prospects in his theory means that it too cannot easily represent the
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preferences revealed in these examples. To overcome this problem, in section 3 we
introduce counterfactuals into Jeffrey’s theory and then, in section 4, show how
this makes it possible to represent such preferences as maximising the value of a
Jeffrey desirability function, even though they cannot be represented as maximis-
ing expected utility. In section 5 we show that, contrary to what decision theorists
and philosophers have typically assumed, a second assumption of ethical actual-
ism, quite different from the aforementioned separability property, is also involved
in the clash between Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences and expected utility the-
ory. Indeed it turns out that ethical actualism and separability are both necessary
for expected utility maximisation and, given the other assumptions of Jeffrey’s
theory, sufficient for it. Since ethical actualism and separability impose unreason-
able constraints on agents’ attitudes, we conclude that rationality does not require
that agents maximise expected utility.
1 Two Paradoxes of Rational Choice
The Allais Paradox has generated a great deal of discussion amongst philosophers,
psychologists and behavioural economists. The paradox is generated by offering
people a pair of choices between different lotteries, each of which consists in tick-
ets being randomly drawn. First people are offered a choice between a lottery that
is certain to result in the decision maker receiving a particular prize, say £2400,
and a lottery that could result in the decision maker receiving nothing, but could
also result in the decision maker receiving either as much as or more than £2400.
The situation can be represented as a choice between the lotteries L1 and L2 be-
low, where for instance L1 results in the decision maker receiving a prize of £2500
if one of tickets number 2 to 34 is drawn:
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1 2− 34 35− 100
L1 £0 £2500 £2400
L2 £2400 £2400 £2400
Having made a choice between L1 and L2, people are asked to make a second
one, this time between lotteries L3 and L4:
1 2− 34 35− 100
L3 £0 £2500 £0
L4 £2400 £2400 £0
Repeated (formal and informal) experiments have confirmed that people tend
to choose and strictly prefer L2 over L1 and L3 over L4. (See Kahneman and
Tversky [1979] for discussion of an early experiment of the Allais Paradox.) One
common way to rationalise this preference, which we will refer to as ‘Allais’ pref-
erence’, is that when choosing between L1 and L2, the possibility of ending up
with nothing when you could have received £2400 for sure outweighs the possi-
ble extra gain of choosing the riskier alternative, since receiving nothing when you
could have gotten £2400 for sure is bound to cause considerable regret (see e.g.
Loomes and Sugden [1982] and Broome [1991]). When it comes to choosing be-
tween L3 and L4, however, the desire to avoid regret does not play as strong role,
since decision makers reason that if they choose L3 and end up with nothing then
they would, in all likelihood, have received nothing even if they had chosen the
less risky option L4.
Intuitively rational as it seems, Allais’ preference is inconsistent with the most
common formal theory of rational choice: expected utility theory (assuming, that
is, that the probabilities of each ticket is the same in the two choice situations.)
According to expected utility theory (EU theory for short), all rational preferences
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over prospects can be represented as maximising the expectation of a utility func-
tion. Formally, let any prospect or option f be a function from a set of states of
the world, S = {Si}, to a set of consequences, with f(Si) being the consequence
of exercising option f when the state of the world is Si. The expected utility of a
prospect f is then defined by:1
EU(f) =
∑
SiS
u(f(Si)).Pr(Si)
where Pr is a probability measure on the states and u a utility measure on con-
sequences. In von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory the probabilities on states
are objective and the prospects are called lotteries; in Savage’s more general frame-
work the probabilities are subjective and the prospects called acts. But these dif-
ferences will not matter to our discussion.
In the usual manner let % represents the agent’s ‘... is least as preferred as ...’
relation between alternatives and  and ∼ the corresponding strict preference and
indifference relations between them. Then EU theory states that for any rational
agent:
f  g iff EU(f) > EU(g) (1)
When this holds for someone’s preferences, we say that the EU function repre-
sents their preferences.
The problem the Allais Paradox poses to decision theory, is that there is no
way to represent Allais’ preference over lotteries in terms of the maximisation of
the value of a function with the EU form. To see this, let us assume that in both
choice situations the decision maker considers the probability of each ticket being
drawn to be 1/100. Then if Allais’ evaluation of the alternatives is in accordance
1We will throughout this paper use period for multiplication.
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with the EU equation, Allais’ preference implies that both:
u(£0) + (33u(£2500)) + (66u(£2400)) < 100u(£2400) (2)
and:
u(£2400) + 33u(£2400) < u(£0) + 33u(£2500)
But the latter implies that:
u(£2400) + 33u(£2400) + 66u(£2400) = 100u(£2400)
< u(£0) + 33u(£2500) + 66u(£2400)
in contradiction with inequality 2. Hence, there is no EU function that simultane-
ously satisfies EU(L1) < EU(L2) and EU(L4) < EU(L3). In other words, there
is no way to represent a person who (strictly) prefers L2 over L1 and L3 over L4
as maximising utility as measured by the an EU function. Since all rational pref-
erence should, according to EU theory, be representable as maximising expected
utility, this suggests that either Allais’ preference is irrational or EU theory is in-
correct. Hence the ‘paradox’: Many people both want to say that Allais’ prefer-
ence is rational and that EU theory is the correct theory of practical rationality.
Another way to see that Allais’ preference cannot be represented as maximis-
ing the value of an EU function, is to notice that the preference violates a condi-
tion on preferences that is required for it to be possible to represent them by an
EU function. The condition requires that when comparing two alternatives whose
consequences depend on what state is actual, rational agents only consider the
state(s) of world where the two alternatives differ. More formally:
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If
S1 S2
Li x z
Lj y z
then Li  Lj iff x  y.
In the choice problem under discussion, this means that you only need to con-
sider the tickets that give different outcomes depending on which alternative is
chosen. Hence, you can ignore the fourth column, i.e. tickets 35-100, both when
choosing between L1 and L2 and when choosing between L3 and L4, since these
tickets give the same outcome no matter which alternative is chosen. When we
ignore this column, however, alternative L1 becomes identical to L3 and L2 to
L4. Hence, by simultaneously preferring L2 over L1 and L3 over L4, the decision
maker seems to have revealed an inconsistency in her preferences.
The second example discussed in the introduction generates a paradox similar
to Allais’ if we assume that there is nothing irrational about strictly preferring a
lottery that gives the patients an equal chance of receiving the kidney to giving
the kidney to either patient without any such lottery being used. If we call the
patients Ann and Bob, and let ANN represent the outcome where Ann receives
the kidney and BOB the outcome where Bob receives the kidney, then to repre-
sent the aforementioned attitude, which we will refer to as ‘Diamond’s preference’,
as maximising the value of an EU function, it has to be possible to simultaneously
satisfy:
u(ANN) < 0.5u(ANN) + 0.5u(BOB)
u(BOB) < 0.5u(ANN) + 0.5u(BOB)
But that is of course impossible: An average of the values u(ANN) and u(BOB)
can never be greater than both values u(ANN) and u(BOB).
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Again, we can see the tension between Diamond’s preference and standard the-
ories of rational choice by noticing that it violates separability. An implication of
separability is that, given the prospects displayed below, where E represents the
outcome of some random event (e.g. a coin toss), L  LA iff LB  LA and L  LB
iff LA  LB. Hence, Diamond’s preference in conjunction with separability implies
a contradiction.
E ¬E
L ANN BOB
LA ANN ANN
LB BOB BOB
The fact that both Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences involve a violation of
separability and that their preferences seem intuitively rational (or at least not ir-
rational), casts doubt on separability as a rationality postulate. Moreover, both
the desire to avoid regret, as manifested in Allais’ preference, and the concern for
giving each patient a ‘fair chance’, which seems to be what underlies Diamond’s
preference, have something to do with counterfactuals. Regret, at least in the sit-
uation under discussion, is a bad feeling associated with knowing that one could
have acted differently and that if one had things would have been better. And
to say that even if Bob did not receive a kidney he nevertheless had a chance,
seems to mean that there is a meaningful sense in which things could have turned
out differently—for instance, a coin could have come up differently—and if they
had, Bob would have received the kidney. So both Allais and Diamond violate
the formal separability requirement of standard decision theories since they judge
that the value of what actually occurs at least partly depends on what could have
been, i.e. on counterfactual possibilities.2
2Lara Buchak ([2013]) has recently suggested a solution to the Allais Paradox that relies on
a slightly different interpretation of Allais’ preference than the one we suggest here. Whereas
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Perhaps for the reason discussed above, some economists and philosophers
have thought that separability as a requirement on preference is implied by an
evaluative assumption we call ethical actualism. Informally put, ethical actualism
is the assumption that only the actual world matters, so that the desirabil-
ity of combinations of what actually occurs and what could have occurred only
depends on the desirability of what actually occurs. In a well-known defence of
separability, Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson argues that it would be irrational to
violate ethical actualism, and since he thinks that ethical actualism implies sepa-
rability, he takes this argument to show that it would be irrational to violate sep-
arability. The separability postulate Samuelson was defending, which is implied
by what we above called separability, states that if some outcome (A)1 is at least
as good as (B)1 and (A)2 is at least as good as (B)2, then an alternative that re-
sults in (A)1 if a fair coin comes up heads but (A)2 if it comes up tails, is at least
as good as an alternative that results in (B)1 if the coin comes up heads but (B)2
if it comes up tails. Here is Samuelson’s informal justification of the axiom:
[E]ither heads or tails must come up: if one comes up, the other can-
not; so there is no reason why the choice between (A)1 and (B)1 should
be ‘contaminated’ by the choice between (A)2 and (B)2. (Samuelson
[1952], pp. 672-3)
In other words, the reason an evaluation or ordering of alternatives should
satisfy separability, is that there should be no desirabilistic dependencies between
we interpret people that display this type of preference as being regret averse, she interprets
them as being risk averse. And she introduces a risk function, that, in addition to a utility and
probability function, represents a person’s attitudes, and argues that rational agents maximise
risk-weighted expected utility. A limitation of Buchak’s account, we think, is that her theory
cannot rationalise Diamond’s preference, since her risk-weighted expected utility function is
such that the expected benefit of a lottery can never exceed the benefits of each of its prizes.
If we are right in that Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences are two instances of a general type of
preference – namely, counterfactual-dependent preference—then it is an advantage of our the-
ory over Buchak’s that we can solve the two paradoxes in the same way, namely by introducing
counterfactuals into the domain of Jeffrey’s decision theory.
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mutually incompatible outcomes; in other words, our preferences should satisfy
separability since our evaluation of outcomes should satisfy ethical actualism.
Some philosophers and decision theorists have cited Samuelson’s remark favourably.
John Broome, who takes it to at least provide a ‘prima facie presumption in favour
of [separability]’, rhetorically asks: “How can something that never happens possi-
bly affect the value of something that does happen?” (Broome [1991], p. 96). But
however closely related ethical actualism and separability might seem to be, the
former does not (by itself) imply the latter. In fact the two are based on differ-
ent, though consistent, intuitions. The former expresses the idea that only what
actually happens matters, while the latter expresses the idea that the desirabil-
ity of what would be the case if one set of conditions held true is independent of
what would be the case if some other set of conditions did. To see that these are
different requirements consider the set of prospects displayed in the matrix below.
E ¬E
L1 ANN BOB
LA ANN ANN
LB BOB BOB
L2 BOB ANN
Now, as we have seen, separability requires that L1  LA iff LB  L2. On
the other hand, ethical actualism requires that, conditional on E being true, L1 ∼
LA and LB ∼ L2. Clearly, in the absence of further restrictions, it is possible
for one of these to hold without the other. So even if Samuelson and Broome are
right about the intuitive appeal of ethical actualism, this does not establish that
separability is rationally required.
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2 Jeffrey Desirability
Not all decision theories assume separability. In particular, the version of decision
theory developed by Richard Jeffrey ([1983]) makes do with much weaker rational-
ity conditions on preference. Indeed, although in an informal sense it is true that
Jeffrey’s theory prescribes choosing actions that have the best expected conse-
quences, the value function that rational agents maximise on his theory is, strictly
speaking, a desirability function but not an expected utility function (the differ-
ence is explained below). The question that we now want to explore is whether we
can represent Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences as maximising Jeffrey desirability,
even though they cannot be represented as expected utility maximising.3
In Jeffrey’s theory preferences are numerically represented by a desirability
function, Des, and a corresponding probability measure, Prob, both defined on a
Boolean algebra of propositions—i.e. a set of propositions closed under negation,
conjunction and disjunction—from which the impossible proposition has been re-
moved. If we take a proposition to be a set of possible worlds, we can state his
theory more formally as follows. Let W be the universal set of possible worlds and
Ω the set of subsets of W (i.e. the power set of W). Then desirability and proba-
bility measures are defined over Ω, elements of which (the propositions) we denote
by non-italic uppercase letters (A, B, C, etc.). We can thus think of each way in
which proposition A can be true as a world that is compatible with the truth of
A. Assuming for simplicity that there are at most countably many mutually ex-
clusive worlds compatible with A, then the Jeffrey-desirability of a proposition is
given by:
3The possibility of representing Allais’ preference as maximising desirability would probably
not have impressed Jeffrey himself, who was satisfied with Savage’s view that Allais’ preference
reveals some sort of ‘error’ of judgement (Savage [1954], pp. 102-3; Jeffrey [1983], p. 722).
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Des(A) =
∑
wi∈W
Des({wi}).P rob({wi} | A)
One way to think of a desirability measure is as an extension of the utility
measure on consequences that expected utility theory postulates (i.e. on possi-
ble worlds or maximally specific propositions) to the entire Boolean algebra of
prospects formed from them.4 For given such a utility measure on consequences/worlds,
we can define the desirability of any prospect as the conditional expectation of
utility, given the truth of the prospect. Note that if for each wi such that Prob({wi} |A) >
0, we can find a proposition Si that is probabilistically independent of A and such
that wi is the consequence of A in Si, then it will be the case that Prob({wi} |A) =
Prob(Si) and the desirability of A will be its unconditional expectation of utility
relative to the probability distribution over the Si. But this is a special case and
in general desirabilities may not take this form.
Our interest in Jeffrey’s theory lies mainly in the possibility that Allais and
Diamond’s preferences are desirability maximising, but there is a second reason
for favouring it over the expected utility theories of Savage and others. To apply
Savage’s theory one must model the decision problem in a very specific way. In
particular, one must find states of the world that are probabilistically indepen-
dent of the acts amongst which one may choose and consequences whose utilities
are independent of the states of the world in which they are realised. In effect,
this latter requirement means that consequences must be identified by propo-
sitions that are maximally specific about everything that matters to the agent.
Real agents are rarely able to formulate decision problems in a manner which
meets these requirements. But if they do not, then there is no guarantee that
4Jeffrey’s theory does not however require that there be such maximally specific propositions
or, to put it differently, that the Boolean algebra of prospects contains atoms. We work with
them for expositional purposes.
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by maximising expected utility relative to the coarse-grained specification of the
decision problem (i.e. relative to the ‘small-world’ decision problem) then they
do so relative to fully refined description of it (i.e. relative to the ‘grand-world’
problem).5 In contrast, Jeffrey’s notion of desirability is partition invariant in
the sense that if a proposition A can be expressed as the disjoint disjunction of
both {B1,B2,B3...} and {C1,C2,C3...}, then
∑
Bi∈A Prob(Bi | A).Des(Bi) =∑
Ci∈A Prob(Ci | A).Des(Ci).6 It follows that applying the rule of desirability
maximisation will always lead to the same recommendation, irrespective of how
the decision problem is framed, while expected utility theory may recommend dif-
ferent courses of action depending on how the decision problem is formulated.
In Jeffrey’s theory acts are just propositions that can be made true at will and
so the desirabilities of acts will partly depend on the conditional probabilities of
their consequences, given the performance of the acts. As a result, separability
can fail. For instance, consider two acts A and B with consequences contingent on
states S1 and S2, as displayed below:
S1 S2
A x z
B y z
Separability requires that A  B iff x  y. But if z is considered a more de-
sirable outcome than both x and y, and A makes S2 more likely than does B, then
A might be assigned a higher Jeffrey desirability than B even when x is not pre-
ferred to y. So Jeffrey’s theory does not require separability.
Unfortunately, this does not completely solve our problem of making Allais’
and Diamond’s preferences consistent with decision theory. For although Jeffrey’s
theory does not imply separability, the theory as it is usually applied is also in-
5See Joyce ([1999]), chapter 3.4 for a fuller discussion.
6See Joyce ([1999]), Theorem 4.1
14
consistent with Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences. Let us focus on the Diamond
paradox to see the problem. LB now represents the set of worlds where Bob gets
the kidney no matter what, L¬B the set of worlds where Ann gets the kidney no
matter what, and L the set of worlds where the toss of a fair coin decides who
gets the kidney. Then for Diamond’s preference to be compatible with Jeffrey’s
theory, it would seem that there has to be a function Des such that:7
Des(ANN) < Des(ANN).P rob(ANN | L) +Des(BOB).P rob(BOB | L)
Des(BOB) < Des(ANN).P rob(ANN | L) +Des(BOB).P rob(BOB | L)
But again, a probability mixture of the desirabilities of ANN and BOB can never
exceed the desirability of both ANN and BOB.
What this shows is that there is more at play than just the failure of separabil-
ity in the explanation of Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences. For the standard rep-
resentation of the two problems, and our application of Jeffrey’s theory to them,
implicitly builds in the aforementioned assumption of ethical actualism. Without
this assumption (but still assuming that the desirability of Ann or Bob getting the
kidney is independent of the random event E), Jeffrey’s theory just says that:
Des(L) = Des(ANN ∧ L).P rob(ANN | L) +Des(BOB ∧ L).P rob(BOB | L)
and nothing requires that Des(ANN∧L) = Des(ANN) or Des(BOB∧L) =
Des(BOB).
It seems then that the way to accommodate the Allais’ and Diamond’s pref-
7We assume that both outcomes, ANN and BOB, are desirabilistically independent of the
random events E and ¬E (e.g. coin comes up heads/tails) that determine the result of the lot-
tery.
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erences within Jeffrey’s framework is just to specify the consequences of actions
sufficiently broadly so as to make it intelligible that, for instance, Ann getting the
kidney in a fair lottery is a different consequence from her getting it as a part of
a process that made it certain she would receive it. More generally, the notion of
consequence should be broadened to take account of what could have happened
as well as what did happen. Just such a response to the two paradox has been
suggested by, for instance, John Broome ([1991]), who argues that if regret and
fairness matter to an agent then that should be part of the description of the out-
comes of lotteries,8 and by Paul Weirich ([1986]), who argues that the correct way
to account for the risk attitudes displayed in the Allais paradox is to allow that
the risk involved in exercising an option counts as one of its consequences.
Solutions of this kind will be unsatisfactory however if they involve introducing
new primitive consequences in the representation of the decision problem, with-
out explaining their relationship to the available actions. In particular, they must
explain what it is about the form of the lottery L that makes Des(ANN∧L) >
Des(ANN). It is not, in our view, sufficient to say that the first outcome is fair
while the latter is not; what is needed, is an explanation of why the first out-
come is fair. Moreover, to avoid trivialising decision theory by making it allow
that any possible choice can be rational, we should require that exercises of this
kind, where new propositions (or consequences) are created to make seemingly
problematic preferences compatible with decision theory, adhere to some indepen-
dently plausible principles as Broome himself points out (see Broome [1999]; see
also discussion of this in Stefa´nsson [forthcoming]).
In the context of Jeffrey’s framework, avoiding these objections requires a
8Broome makes his suggestion for resolving the problem within Savage’s framework but, as
he notes, this leads to other problems; most notably to a tension with what he calls the rectan-
gular field assumption. As Jeffrey’s theory makes no such assumption, the solution looks more
promising in his framework.
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specification of the propositional structure of lotteries and acts and the attitudes
that they support. We do so by widening the domain of Jeffrey’s theory to in-
clude counterfactual propositions and showing that the properties that generate
Allais’ and Diamond’s paradoxes, respectively regret and fairness, then emerge as
a relationship between factual and counterfactual propositions. Our solution thus
provides at least a partial explanation of the preferences that generate these para-
doxes, by highlighting the effects counterfactuals have on the desirabilities of the
prospects in question.9 Moreover, our solution does not trivialise decision theory,
since the domain of Jeffrey’s original theory is extended in a principled way (to be
explained in the next section) and the resulting theory requires that people’s pref-
erences between all propositions satisfy the so-called Bolker-Jeffrey axioms (which
we introduce in section 3.2).
This solution to the problems raised by Allais and Diamond is not ad hoc, we
think, since decision theory should, independently of these problems, allow for the
value dependencies one often finds between actual and counterfactual outcomes.
And this solution has the advantage over the refinement solution suggested by
Broome, that whereas he solves each of the two problems under discussion by
introducing different properties to the description of the outcomes, our solution
solves both problems at once by introducing counterfactual conditionals to the do-
main of Jeffrey’s decision theory. Hence, while the typical refinement solution to
the problems raised by Allais and Diamond treats the two preferences as having
nothing in common except violation of separability, our solution makes explicit
that these are two instances of a general type of preference that causes trouble for
EU theory; namely, counterfactual-dependent preference.
9The explanation is only partial since a full explanation would, in the case of the Diamond
paradox, give a philosophical account of why counterfactuals can have moral value and, in the
case of the Allais paradox, give a psychological account of why people care about what could
have been. But such a discussion would go beyond the topic of this paper.
17
Before introducing counterfactual conditionals to Jeffrey’s theory, let us first
briefly explain why introducing indicative conditionals to Jeffrey’s theory (as e.g.
done in Bradley [1998] and Bradley [2007]) will not solve the problem of repre-
senting Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences. An indicative conditional is generally
considered to be what Jonathan Bennett calls zero intolerant, “meaning that such
a conditional is useless to someone who is really sure that its antecedent is false”
(Bennett [2003], p. 45). In other words, if ‘ 7→’ represents the indicative condi-
tional connective, then A 7→ B is informative for someone who thinks that A
might be true (where ‘might’ is understood epistemically, not merely logically or
metaphysically). But A 7→ B provides no information about a world where one
is certain that A is false. (Hence, its ‘uselessness’ to someone who is certain that
A is false.10) It is therefore plausible to assume, as Bradley does, that Des(¬A ∧
(A 7→ B)) = Des(¬A), since if A is believed to be false A 7→ B makes no de-
sirabilistic difference. Thus the conditionals that generate the paradoxes under
discussion cannot be indicative conditionals, since the problems they generate con-
sist exactly in the fact that they have desirabilistic impact when their antecedents
are believed to be false.
What we need to do therefore is introduce counterfactual conditionals into Jef-
frey’s theory. Jeffrey himself recognised the need to do so and tried to solve the
problem of providing an account of counterfactuals, but in his own view did not
succeed.
(If I had, you would have heard of it. There’s a counterfactual for
you.) In fact, the problem hasn’t been solved to this day. I expect it’s
10The fact that a conditional is zero-tolerant does not necessarily mean that its antecedent is
false. Hence, some want to call such conditionals subjunctive conditionals rather than counter-
factuals. That name is however not necessarily any better, since zero-tolerant conditionals are
not always expressed in the subjunctive mood. Hence, we will stick with the term ‘counterfac-
tual’.
18
unsolvable. (Jeffrey [1991], p. 161)
Jeffrey was unduly pessimistic. Since he made this remark there has been con-
siderable progress in the understanding of counterfactuals, progress that we now
build on.
3 Counterfactuals
Our problem is to find a way of representing counterfactual propositions (coun-
terfactuals for short) in a way that enables us to exploit the resources of Jeffrey’s
decision theory to model Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences. To do so we extend
standard possible world modelling of propositions in a natural way by introducing
the notion of a possible counteractual world under a supposition. A possible world
is a way things might be or might have been. A possible counteractual world un-
der the supposition that some A is true, on the other hand, is just a way things
might be, or might have been, were A true.
If world wA could be the case under the supposition that A, then we will say
that wA is a possible counteractual A-world. If A is false, wA will be said to be
strictly counterfactual. (Any counteractual A-world is strictly counterfactual rel-
ative to any possible world in which A is false for instance. But counteractual
worlds are not always strictly counterfactual: If A is true then wA may not only
be a possible way things are under that supposition that A, but the way things
actually are.)
Our basic thesis is: Possible counteractual worlds make counterfactual claims
true in the same way that possible actual worlds make factual claims true. For in-
stance, if wA is a counteractual A-world at which it is true that B, then wA makes
it true that if A were the case then B would be. Thus the counteractual world in
which Obama is born in Kenya and goes to school in Nairobi makes it true that
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had Obama been born in Kenya he would have gone to school in Nairobi, while
the counteractual world in which he is born in Kenya but goes to school in Mom-
basa, makes it false.
To illustrate this thesis, consider a simple model based on the set W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5}
of just five possible worlds (that are the primitives of the model) and the corre-
sponding set Ω of its subsets, including the events A = {w1, w2, w3}, A¯ = {w4, w5},
B = {w1, w2, w4} and C = {w1, w3, w5} which are respectively the sets of worlds
at which it is true that A, ¬A, B and C (throughout, we use A¯ to denote W -
A). Relative to the set of possible worlds W, a supposition induces a set of possi-
ble counteractual worlds. The supposition that A, for instance, induces the set of
counteractual A-worlds, WA = {w1, w2, w3}, and the corresponding set of sets of
counteractual worlds, ΩA, containing conditional events BA = {wi ∈ WA : wi ∈
B} = {w1, w2}, CA = {w1, w3} and so on. The supposition that A is false induces
a different set of counteractual worlds—namely WA¯ = {w4, w5}—and a corre-
sponding set of conditional events ΩA¯. The supposition that B yet another. And
so on. Note that we have adopted the convention of denoting sets of worlds with
non-italicised letters, with A denoting the set of worlds at which it is true that A
and BA denoting the set of A-worlds at which it is true that B. Also note that the
same world can represent a potentially actual world and a counteractual world un-
der a supposition: w1, for instance, can represent the actual world (if A, B and C
are all true) but also the world that would be actual if, say, A were true.
For simplicity, we restrict attention to a single supposition for the moment,
namely the supposition that A. The set of elementary possibilities is then given
by a subset z of the cross-product of W and WA, which can be presented in tabu-
lar form as follows.
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Supposed A-worlds
Worlds w1 w2 w3
w1 〈w1, w1〉 〈w1, w2〉 〈w1, w3〉
w2 〈w2, w1〉 〈w2, w2〉 〈w2, w3〉
w3 〈w3, w1〉 〈w3, w2〉 〈w3, w3〉
w4 〈w4, w1〉 〈w4, w2〉 〈w4, w3〉
w5 〈w5, w1〉 〈w5, w2〉 〈w5, w3〉
Each ordered pair ωij = 〈wi, wj〉 appearing in the cells of the table represents
an elementary possibility: that wi is the actual world and that wj is the counter-
actual A-world. Sets of such possibilities will serve for us as propositions. Factual
propositions are given by unions of rows of the table. The proposition that A, for
instance, is given by the first, second and third rows of the table, while that of B
by the first, second and fourth. Conditional propositions, on the other hand, are
given by unions of columns of the table. The proposition that if A then B, for in-
stance, is given by the first and second columns of the table, while the proposition
that if A then C is given by the first and third columns. Conjunctions, disjunc-
tions and negations of propositions (conditional or otherwise) are given by their
intersection, union and complements.
The above table implicitly assumes that every element of W × WA is a possi-
ble combination of facts and counterfacts, but this assumption is easy to dispense
with. To generate a space z of elementary possibilities we make use of a selection
function on worlds which determines which counteractual worlds are ‘accessible’
from them. Formally, a selection function f is a mapping from W×Ω to Ω satisfy-
ing, for all w ∈W and A ⊆ W:
1. f(w, A) ⊆ A
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2. f(w, A) = ∅⇔ A = ∅
3. If w ∈ A then w ∈ f(w, A)
The first condition simply states that counteractual worlds under the suppo-
sition that A must be worlds at which it is true that A and the second that the
set of counteractual worlds is empty only if the supposition is contradictory. The
third condition requires that any world at which it is true that A must be a possi-
ble counteractual A-world. This condition is termed Weak Centring, in contrast to
its stronger ‘cousin’ that is typically assumed in the semantics of counterfactuals,
namely:
Centring: If w ∈ A then f(w, A) = {w}
Centring expresses a particular conception of the relation between factual
and counterfactual possibility, according to which what is actually true deter-
mines what might have been true under any supposition consistent with the ac-
tual truth. This is surely right for epistemic possibility: If an agent takes the ac-
tual world to be w, and knows that A is true at w, then it should not be epistem-
ically possible according to her that any world other than w be the case on the
supposition that A. Epistemic possibility would seem to be what is at issue when
we reason evidentially using indicative conditionals. On the other hand it is much
more controversial whether Centring governs causal possibility and hence whether
it is appropriate to counterfactual reasoning. Both Lewis and Stalnaker assume
that it is, perhaps because they take counterfactual and evidential reasoning to
coincide when what is being supposed is in fact true. But in the absence of a de-
terministic relationship between two events it does not seem obviously right to
regard the fact of their co-occurrence to imply that the occurrence of one causally
necessitated the other. So it is not clear that the assumption is appropriate for
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counterfactuals. In any case, we do not need to settle the issue here and will for
the sake of generality not assume Centring.11
We now have all the ingredients in place to state our account of counterfactual
possibility. As before let W be a set of possible worlds, Ω be a Boolean algebra of
subsets of W, and S = {Si} ⊆ Ω be a set of n suppositions. The elementary possi-
bilities on this account are n-tuples of worlds 〈w,w1, ..., wn〉, with w ∈ W and each
wi ∈ Si. Propositions are sets of such n-tuples of worlds. More formally, a Suppo-
sitional Algebra is a structure 〈W,Ω,S, f,z,Γ〉 with f a selection function from
the set of worlds W and set of suppositions S to sets of worlds, that determines a
set z of elementary n-tuples of worlds by:
z := {ω = 〈w,w1, ..., wn〉 : w ∈W, wi ∈ f(w, Si)}
and Γ a Boolean algebra of subsets of z (the propositions).
For any Si ∈ S, let Ωi be the power set of Si. We adopt the convention of de-
noting subsets of Ωi by non-italicised capitals subscripted by i. Given X ∈ Ω and
Yi ∈ Ωi, let 〈X, Y1, ..., Yn〉 be the element of Γ that is the proposition that X
is the case, that Y1 is or would be the case, on the supposition that S
1 is or was,
..., and that Yn is or would be, on the supposition that S
n. Each such ordered n-
tuple is thus a coarse-grained but complex proposition concerning both what is
and what could be. When there is no risk of ambiguity we drop ‘empty’ notation
and write X for 〈X, S1, ..., Sn〉, the proposition that X is the case; Yi for 〈W, S1,
..., Yi, ..., Sn〉, the proposition that if Si is or were the case then Yi is or would
be; (X, Yi) for 〈X, S1, ..., Yi, ..., Sn〉; and so on. It follows that (X, Yi) = X ∩ Yi,
11However, the simple version of the multidimensional model that we will work with entails
the so-called Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM)—according to which it is either the case that
if A were true then B would be true, or if A were true then B would be false—which together
with Weak Centring entails Centring. A more general version of this model does not entail
CEM.
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〈Y1, ..., Yn〉 = ∩(Yi) and so on. A special convention for the propositions Si serv-
ing as suppositions: We will write (Si)i for the proposition that if S
i is or were the
case then Si is or would be. Note that (Si)i = z, since for all w ∈W, f(w,Si) ∈Si.
Propositions of the form 〈Y1, ..., Yn〉, which specify what will or would be the
case under each supposition, are of particular interest to our discussion in virtue
of serving as representations of the actions over which agents have preferences.
Consider, for instance, the case described by Diamond which was previously repre-
sented in tabular form by:
E ¬E
L ANN BOB
LA ANN ANN
LB BOB BOB
In our framework, ANN , BOB and E, as well as any Boolean compound of
them, would make up the set of factual propositions, with E and ¬E serving as
the suppositions of interest. The full set of propositions would then be given by
the cross product of the set of factual propositions and {E,¬E}, and any Boolean
compounds of them. This would contain such conditional propositions as ANNE,
the proposition that Ann would get the kidney if E were the case, and BOBE¯, the
proposition that Bob would get the kidney if E were not the case. The lottery L
would be identified by the complex proposition (ANNE, BOBE¯); a proposition
that is a conjunction of the conditional propositions ANNE and BOBE¯, i.e. L =
ANNE ∩ BOBE¯. Similarly for the degenerate lotteries LA = (ANNE, ANNE¯) and
LB = (BOBE, BOBE¯). Our task now is to say what attitudes one can rationally
take to such propositions.
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3.1 Probability and desirability of counterfactuals
Beliefs about counterfactual possibilities play an important role in our reasoning
about what we should do, for they are the means by which we consider the conse-
quences of our actions. So too do our evaluative attitudes to counterfactual pos-
sibilities: for instance, through the regret we anticipate if we forego opportunities
that would have led to desirable outcomes. These attitudes to the counterfacts are
at least partially independent of our attitudes to the facts. One might be pretty
sure that the match is to be played tomorrow, for instance, but quite unsure as to
whether it would be played were it to rain. Equally one could be quite sure that
the match will not be played were it to rain, but quite unsure as to whether it
will rain or not. Similarly, our assessment of how desirable something is can differ
from our assessment of how desirable it is on the supposition of some condition
or other. Even if one prefers to be served a cold beer rather than a hot chocolate
tonight, the preference could be reversed under the supposition that the evening
will be very cold.
An agent’s combined uncertainty about what is the case and what would be
so under various possible suppositions will be captured here by a probability mass
function, p, on the set z of ordered n-tuples of worlds that constitute the elemen-
tary possibilities in our model. The mass function p measures the joint probabili-
ties of actuality and counteractuality under the various suppositions: p(〈w,w1, ..., wn〉)
is the probability that w is the actual world, that w1 is/would be the counter-
actual world on the supposition that S1, ..., and that wn is/would be the coun-
teractual world on the supposition that Sn. Similarly we introduce by a utility
function, u, on n-tuples of worlds to measure the agent’s evaluations of different
combinations of factuality and couterfactuality. For example, u(〈w,w1, ..., wn〉)
will measure the desirability that w is the actual world, that w1 is/would be the
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counteractual world on the supposition that S1, ..., and that wn is/would be the
counteractual world on the supposition that Sn. For convenience, we assume, as
Jeffrey [1983] does, that u is zero-normalised in the sense that:12
∑
ω∈z
u(ω).p(ω) = 0
The mass function p and utility function u induce a corresponding pair of mea-
sures, Prob and Des, on the set Γ of all propositions by means of the following
definitions. For all α ∈ Γ (where α could be either factual or conditional):13
Prob(α) :=
∑
ω∈α
p(ω)
Des(α) :=
∑
ω∈α
u(ω).p(ω)
Prob(α)
(3)
Within our multidimensional possible world model, Prob and Des respec-
tively encode the agent’s state of belief and desire regarding both the facts and
the counterfacts, with Prob(〈X,Y1,...,Yn〉) measuring the joint probability that X
is the case and that Yi is or would be the case if S
i, and Des(〈X,Y1,...,Yn〉) mea-
suring the joint desirability that X is the case and that Yi is or would be the case
if Si.
It is evident that Prob satisfies the standard axioms of probability. In virtue
of the zero-normalisation of u it follows immediately from equation 3 that Des is
normalised with respect to the tautology, i.e. that Des(z) = 0. Finally, it follows
from equation 3 that Des respects Jeffrey’s axiom of desirability, namely:
12Nothing of any substance depends on this zero-normalisation which is introduced for mathe-
matical convenience alone.
13As is evident from this definition, Des is not defined for propositions with zero probability.
In fact, the Jeffrey-Bolker theorem (reproduced in section 3.2) assumes that agents don’t have
evaluative opinions of such propositions.
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Desirability: If α ∩ β = ∅, then:
Des(α ∪ β) = Des(α).P rob(α) +Des(β).P rob(β)
Prob(α ∪ β)
To see this, let α and β be two disjoint propositions. Then:
Des(α ∪ β) =
∑
ω∈α∨β
u(ω).p(ω)
Prob(α ∪ β)
=
∑
ω∈α
u(ω).p(ω)
Prob(α ∪ β) +
∑
ω∈β
u(ω).p(ω)
Prob(α ∪ β)
=
Des(α).P rob(α) +Des(β).P rob(β)
Prob(α ∪ β)
We conclude that our possible world model allows for an extension of Jeffrey’s
decision theory to counterfactual propositions.
3.2 Representations
We are now in a position to address the question of the conditions under which
an agent’s preferences can be represented by a pair of functions, Prob and Des, as
defined above. In other words, what conditions must her preferences satisfy if they
are to be representable in terms of desirability maximisation? In fact most of the
work needed to answer this question has already been achieved by showing how to
construct an Boolean algebra of counterfactual propositions (indeed, the difficulty
in doing so was the main stumbling block in previous attempts to extend Jeffrey’s
theory). For given this, we can simply help ourselves to the representation theo-
rem for Jeffrey’s decision theory proved by Ethan Bolker ([1966]) to establish the
existence of such a representation.
Bolker imposes two main conditions on preferences in addition to the standard
requirement that they be continuous, complete and transitive. To state them in
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a form appropriate to our discussion, let % be a complete, transitive and contin-
uous relation on a Boolean algebra of propositions (construed as sets of n-tuples
of worlds) and let ≈ and  be the corresponding indifference and strict preference
relations on propositions. Then Bolker postulates:
Averaging: If α ∩ β = ∅, then α % (α ∪ β) % β ⇔ α % β
Impartiality: Suppose α ≈ β and α ∩ β = ∅, and that for some γ 6≈ α, β such
that α ∩ γ = β ∩ γ = ∅, it is the case that α ∪ γ ≈ β ∪ γ. Then for all such
γ, α ∪ γ ≈ β ∪ γ.
The axiom of Averaging is the main rationality constraint on preference re-
quired for desirability maximisation and was implicitly assumed in our construc-
tion of a value function on counterfactual propositions. The essential idea that
motivates it is that no proposition can be better (worse) than its best (worst) re-
alisation. The proposition that α ∪ β is consistent with it being the case that α
and with it being the case that β, but not both if α and β are mutually exclusive.
Suppose α is preferred to β. Then at worst it being the case that α∪β means that
β and, at best, that α. So the desirability one attaches to α∪ β should lie between
that of α and β.
Impartiality, on the other hand, is a rationality constraint on the relation be-
tween preference and belief. It says that we can test for the equiprobability of any
two co-ranked propositions α and β by taking a third proposition γ that is incon-
sistent with both and checking to see whether α∪ γ and β ∪ γ are ranked together.
For suppose that the probability of α was in fact greater than that of β. Then it
would be less likely that γ given that α ∪ γ than it would be that γ given that
β ∪ γ. And so α ∪ γ would be either a less or a more attractive proposition than
β ∪ γ depending on whether γ  α, β or α, β  γ. But if the probabilities of α and
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β are the same then it should be the case for all γ inconsistent with both α and β,
that α ∪ γ ≈ β ∪ γ.
Let us say that a pair of desirability and probability functions, Des and Prob,
jointly represent a preference relation % just in case for all α and β in the domain
of %:
α % β ⇔ Des(α) ≥ Des(β)
In this case we say that the pair (Prob,Des) constitute a Jeffrey representation
of the preference relation %. What Bolker proved was that, given some technical
conditions on the set of propositions (specifically that they constitute a complete,
atomless Boolean algebra) and on the preference relation % (specifically that it
generates a weak and continuous order on the set of propositions), satisfaction of
the axioms of Averaging and Impartiality is necessary and sufficient for the pref-
erence relation to be desirability maximising. Since the sets of n-tuples of worlds
forms a Boolean algebra of propositions, his theorem applies directly to our frame-
work. More formally:
Theorem 1 (Bolker [1966]) Let 〈Γ,⊆〉 be a complete, atomless Boolean alge-
bra of sets of n-tuples of worlds (propositions). Let % be a complete, transitive and
continuous relation on Γ − {∅}. Then there exists a pair of desirability and prob-
ability functions, Des and Prob, respectively on Γ − {∅} and Γ, that are a Jeffrey
representation of % iff % satisfies Averaging and Impartiality.
4 Counterfactual-Dependent Preferences
Let us then return to the task of representing Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences.
Recall that these preferences cannot be represented as maximising the value of
an EU function because the EU equation implies that the value of an outcome
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in state Si is desirabilistically independent of any outcome in state Sj that is in-
compatible with Si; which in turn implies that the value of what actually occurs
never depends on what merely could have been. (In the next section we define EU
functions for Suppositional Algebras.) But for people with Allais’ preference, the
desirability of receiving nothing is not independent of whether or not one could
have chosen a risk-free alternative. Similarly, for people with preferences like Dia-
mond’s, the desirability of either patient not receiving the kidney is not indepen-
dent of what would have occurred had some random event turned out differently.
So both Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences, on this interpretation, are dependent
on the truth of counterfactuals. Moreover, the part that causes the violation of
expected utility theory can in both cases be formalised as a relationship between a
proposition and a set of worlds that are strictly counter-actual.
To make the above claim more precise let’s look at Diamond’s preference first
and suppose that Diamond wants to use a coin toss to decide who receives the
kidney. Let H be the set of worlds where the coin comes heads up and T the set
of worlds where the coin comes tails up (so T ≡ H¯). Let B be the set of worlds
where Bob receives the kidney and A the set of worlds where Ann receives the
kidney (so A ≡ B¯ given the assumption that exactly one of them receives the kid-
ney). We have thus made two simplifying assumptions already. Firstly, it might
seem more natural to let H (T) be the set of worlds where the coin comes heads
(tails) up if tossed. But nothing is lost, we believe, by this simplification. Sec-
ondly, we have limited our attention to situations where either Ann or Bob re-
ceives the kidney. But what is distinctive about Diamond’s preference is what it
has to say about situations where a number of individuals have an equal claim on
an indivisible good that some but not all of them get. (Any kind of welfarism for
instance condemns a situation where none of the needing patients receive the kid-
ney.) Hence, since we want to focus on what is special about this preference, it is
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justifiable to limit our attention to situations where one of Anna and Bob receives
the kidney.
The part of Diamond’s preference that leads to violation of expected utility
theory can then be formulated thus:
(H ∩ B,AT)  (H ∩ B,BT) (4)
In other words, Diamond prefers the proposition that the coin comes heads
up and Bob receives the kidney but Ann would have gotten it had tails come up,
to the proposition that the coin comes heads up and Bob receives the kidney and
would also have gotten it had the coin come tails up.
Let us then turn to Allais’ preference and let R represent the set of worlds
where Allais chooses the risky option (which will be L1 or L3 depending on the
choice situation) and G the set of worlds where Allais is guaranteed to win some-
thing. Unlike when representing Diamond’s preference, we need a third (basic) set
of worlds to represent Allais’ preference, since the worlds where Allais is not guar-
anteed to win anything are not necessarily the same as the worlds where Allais
wins nothing. But it is relative to a situation where Allais has won nothing that
the fact that he could have chosen a risk-free alternative makes a difference. Let
N denote the set of worlds where Allais wins nothing. Then the preference that
causes Allais to violate expected utility theory can be represented thus:
(R ∩ G¯ ∩ N, G¯R¯)  (R ∩ G¯ ∩ N,GR¯) (5)
In other words, according to Allais, winning nothing after having made a risky
choice is made worse when it is true that had he chosen differently he would defi-
nitely have won something.
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4.1 Preference actualism and desirability maximisation
We have seen that both Diamond’s and Allais’ preferences exhibit a non-trivial
sensitivity to counterfactual states of affairs that is manifested in the violation of
a condition that we will call Preference Actualism: the requirement that prefer-
ences for propositions be independent of the strict counterfacts. Formally:
Preference Actualism: For all sets of worlds A, B, C such that C ∩ A¯ = ∅:
(C,BA¯) ∼ (C, B¯A¯)
Preference Actualism is of course just a version of the doctrine of ethical ac-
tualism that was informally introduced earlier. As we mentioned then, and will
explain more precisely in section 5, it is not sufficient that preferences are separa-
ble for them to satisfy Preference Actualism. An agent may regard the desirabil-
ity of the counterfacts to be independent without thinking that the counterfacts
do not matter. In the Diamond example such an agent might have preferences
LB  L  LA, in accordance with separability, but contrary to Preference Ac-
tualism not be indifferent between L and LA, conditional on E being the case,
perhaps because she values the two relevant strict counterfacts—that Bob or Ann
would have got it if E had not been the case—differently but positively.
In the appendix, we prove (as Theorem 15) that preferences that violate Pref-
erence Actualism cannot be represented as maximising expected utility (as defined
in next section). Since a preference might violate Preference Actualism without
violating separability, this result does not simply follow from the fact that sepa-
rability is a necessary condition for expected utility maximisation. The indepen-
dence of these two assumptions has not been recognised in the decision theoretic
literature, perhaps because, together with certain assumptions that are either im-
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plicitly or explicitly part of standard formulations of expected utility theory and
which do seem to be satisfied in Allais’ and Diamond’s examples (in particular,
Centring and an assumption about the probabilistic independence of counterfacts
under disjoint suppositions), Preference Actualism does imply separability. In-
deed, given these assumptions, Allais’ and Diamond’s violation of Preference Ac-
tualism can be seen as explaining why they violate separability.
While expected utility maximisation requires adherence to ethical actualism, it
is perfectly possible for preferences to satisfy Bolker’s axioms but violate Prefer-
ence Actualism. To show this we work again with our simple model based on the
set W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5} of five possible worlds and the corresponding set Ω of
its subsets, including the events A = {w1, w2, w3}, A¯ = {w4, w5}, B = {w1, w2, w4}
and B¯ = {w3, w5}. For present purposes we only need to focus on one supposi-
tion, namely the supposition that A is false. Then the set of elementary possibil-
ities is given by W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5} × {w4, w5} and, in particular, (A∩B,
B¯A¯) = {〈w1, w5〉, 〈w2, w5〉} and (A∩B, BA¯) = {〈w1, w4〉, 〈w2, w4〉}.
To induce the preferences required, we define a pair of probability and util-
ity mass functions, p and u, on this set of world pairs, by setting p(〈w4, w5〉) =
p(〈w5, w4〉) = 0 and assigning the values to remaining possibilities displayed in the
following table:
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World Pairs Probability Utility
〈w1, w4〉 0.125 −1
〈w1, w5〉 0.125 1
〈w2, w4〉 0.125 −1
〈w2, w5〉 0.125 1
〈w3, w4〉 0.125 −1
〈w3, w5〉 0.125 1
〈w4, w4〉 0.125 0
〈w5, w5〉 0.125 0
Let Prob and Des be pair of probability and desirability functions on ℘(W)
constructed from p and u in the manner previously outlined by application of the
standard axioms of probability and desirability. It is easy to see that the prefer-
ences induced by Des will violate Preference Actualism. In particular they will be
such that:
(A ∩ B, B¯A¯)  (A ∩ B,BA¯) (6)
(A ∩ B¯,BA¯)  (A ∩ B, B¯A¯) (7)
But by construction they satisfy the standard preference axioms of Jeffrey’s
decision theory. So it follows that preferences violating Preference Actualism, al-
though not representable as expected utility maximising, may nonetheless be de-
sirability maximising.
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4.2 Modelling Allais’ and Diamond’s preferences
Strictly speaking, equation 4 does not quite represent Diamond’s preference in
full. Recall that Diamond’s preference consists in preferring a lottery (say a coin
toss) that results in either Bob or Ann receiving a kidney (alternative L) to giving
the kidney to Ann without using a fair lottery (alternative LA) and also to giv-
ing the kidney to Bob without using a fair lottery (alternative LB). This is how
Diamond might evaluate the ‘constant’ alternatives:
Des(LA) = Des(H ∩ A,AT)
Des(LB) = Des(H ∩ B,BT)
But since the lottery can turn out in more than one way, Diamond must, if he
is to satisfy Jeffrey’s equation, evaluate its desirability as a weighted sum of the
ways in which it might turn out, for instance:
Des(L) = 0.5Des(H ∩ B,AT) + 0.5Des(T ∩ A,BH)
assuming that he believes the coin to have an equal chance of coming up heads as
tails when it is tossed.
There is thus a Jeffrey-desirability function representing Diamond’s preference
as long as there is a function Des that simultaneously satisfies:
Des(H ∩ B,BT) < 0.5Des(H ∩ B,AT) + 0.5Des(T ∩ A,BH)
Des(H ∩ A,AT) < 0.5Des(H ∩ B,AT) + 0.5Des(T ∩ A,BH)
Since what motivates Diamond’s preference is his concern for fairness, he is
(let us suppose) indifferent between Bob and Ann actually receiving the kidney.
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Moreover, the value generated by having used the lottery, or the disvalue gen-
erated by not having used the lottery, is according to Diamond independent of
whether Ann or Bob actually receives the kidney. Hence, for Diamond:
0.5Des(H ∩ B,AT) + 0.5Des(T ∩ A,BH) = Des(H ∩ B,AT)
= Des(T ∩ A,BH)
Des(H ∩ B,BT) = Des(H ∩ A,AT)
Therefore, to be able to represent Diamond’s preference as maximising Jeffrey-
desirability, all that is required is that there is a Jeffrey-desirability function such
that:
Des(H ∩ B,BT) < Des(H ∩ B,AT)
That is, all we need is that there be a Jeffrey function that can represent a
preference that violates Preference Actualism. In last subsection we saw that such
a function exists.
The same can be said for Allais’ preference, namely that it is only partly cap-
tured by equation 5. But again, it is not hard to show that in Allais’ case all that
needs to be established is that there is a desirability function such that Des(R∩G¯∩N,
GR¯) < Des(R∩G¯∩N, G¯R¯). And this follows from what we established in last sub-
section.
5 Ethical Actualism and Separability
We have argued that there are rational patterns of preference that are desirabil-
ity maximising but not expected utility maximising. In this last section we turn
to the question of what additional assumptions are needed for an agent’s prefer-
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ences to be representable, not just by a desirability function, but by a desirability
function that takes the form of an expected utility. Our ambitions are three-fold:
To establish the formal relationships between various salient properties of value
functions, to exhibit the conditions that are necessary for expected utility max-
imisation, and to argue that these additional conditions are too strong to apply
generally and hence that rationality does not require expected utility maximisa-
tion.
Let us begin by defining more carefully what it means for a desirability func-
tion to be an expected utility. Recall that acts are modelled in our framework by
propositions of the form 〈Y1, ..., Yn〉, where each Yi is the consequence of choos-
ing the action in question in the event that Si. An expected utility representation
of a preference relation is characterised by a particular form that the desirability
of such propositions take, namely that their desirabilities are probability weighted
averages of the desirabilities of the Yi. More exactly:
Expected Utility: A desirability function Des defined on a suppositional alge-
bra of propositions is an expected utility on this algebra iff for any partition
of suppositions S = {Si}:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Yi|Si).P rob(Si)
Hereafter, EU theory should be understood as the claim that rational pref-
erences are representable by a desirability function that is an expected utility as
defined here. It should be noted however that this definition of an expected utility
is somewhat more general than the usual one in that it allows that the desirabil-
ities of consequences be dependent on the states of the world in which they are
realised. In the event that state-independence holds, it follows that Des(Yi|Si) =
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Des(Yi). Then if we let act f be the proposition 〈Y1, ..., Yn〉 and f(Si) = Yi, we
obtain the familiar Savage formulation of expected utility: Des(f) =
∑n
i=1Des(f(S
i)).P rob(Si).
Although state-dependence is natural in Jeffrey’s framework, only some ver-
sions of expected utility theory allow for it (for example Karni [1985]). Accommo-
dating state-dependence has the important, and beneficial, implication that the
expected utilities of actions with coarse-grained consequences can be computed,
so that the usual requirement of (e.g. Savage’s) EU theory that consequences be
maximally specific can be dispensed with. But another problematic requirement
of the theory, that the states of the world be probabilistically independent of the
acts, cannot. For as we will show in section 5.3, such independence is implied by
the EU theory formulated here. But first we tackle our main objective, namely
showing that a preference relation that can be represented as maximising desir-
ability can also be represented as maximising expected utility just in case it satis-
fies both a separability condition and a condition of ethical actualism.
5.1 Independence and Additive Separability
We have noted at various points that expected utility theory implies that the
agent’s preferences are separable or that they are representable by an additively
separable utility function. Our next task is to make precise what this require-
ment amounts to in the framework in which we are working. Intuitively two sets
of propositions are separable from the point of view of some agent if their prefer-
ences for the members of one of the sets are independent of the truth or falsity of
the members of the other set. If we consider not the preferences but the desirabil-
ities that represent them, this translates into the requirement that the desirability
of any member of one set is independent of the truth of any proposition in the
other.
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In this context, the sets of propositions that are relevant are the sets of coun-
terfactuals under disjoint suppositions. And the form of separability that is re-
quired by expected utility theory can be rendered as the principle that the desir-
ability that any Yi would be the case if S
i were true is independent of what would
be the case if any supposition inconsistent with Si were true. More formally, given
a set of disjoint suppositions {Si} and a desirability Des, it must be the case that
for any Yi∗ :
Des(Yi∗ |
⋂
i 6=i∗
Yi) = Des(W, Yi∗)
Then it follows from the definition of conditional desirability14 that:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) = Des(Y1 | Y2,...,Yn) +Des(Y2,...,Yn)
= Des(Y1) +Des(Y2 | Y3,...,Yn) +Des(Y3,...,Yn)
= Des(Y1) +Des(Y2) + ...
=
n∑
i=1
Des(Yi)
When a numerical representation of preference takes this form then it is said
to be additive or additively separable. So we can conclude that a desirability mea-
sure is additively separable over the Si iff the counterfacts under any supposition
are desirabilistically independent of those under any other supposition disjoint to
it.
In the light of this we can state as follows the separability condition required
for expected utility:
14See the appendix for a statement of its definition.
39
Counterfact Separability: If {Si}ni=1 is a set of n disjoint suppositions, then:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Yi)
Just how strong a condition this is can be brought out by noting that if a de-
sirability function is additively separable then the corresponding probability func-
tion is multiplicative, i.e. for any Yi 6≈ W:
Counterfact Independence: If {Si}ni=1 is a set of n disjoint suppositions, then:
Prob(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∏
i=1
Prob(Yi)
The claim that Counterfact Separability implies Counterfact Independence is
proven in the appendix as Theorem 9. But it can be intuitively explained by the
fact that the counterfacts cannot be desirabilistically independent of each other
unless knowing that one of the counterfacts holds is irrelevant to how likely the
other counterfacts are to be true. Note that this implication still holds even if
Counterfact Separability is restricted to just a particular class of propositions,
such as those that are maximally specific with regard to all that the agent cares
about.
Counterfact Independence is not a plausible candidate for a general rationality
constraint on belief and it is easy enough to find counter-examples to the claim
that it is. Suppose I know that a prize is contained in one and only one of two
boxes. I am about to pick one of the boxes but before opening it I am told that
were I to open the other box I would win the prize. I can infer immediately that
if I open the box I intended then I will not win the prize. So the counterfacts un-
der the supposition that I open one box are not independent of those under the
supposition that I open the other, in violation of Counterfact Independence. The
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fact that expected utility theory requires Counterfact Independence (as we shall
shortly show) therefore suggests that EU theory is not a correct theory of ratio-
nality.
Let’s conclude by introducing another independence condition on belief that
will turn out to be important in our discussion of expected utility theory, namely
the requirement that the facts be probabilisically independent from the strict
counterfacts. More precisely:
Fact-Counterfact Independence: If X ∩ Si = ∅, then:
Prob(X,Yi) = Prob(X).P rob(Yi)
The two independence conditions are closely related, but not equivalent. In
the presence of Centring, Fact-Counterfact Independence does indeed imply Coun-
terfact Independence, but the latter only implies the former in the presence of a
further condition, namely:
Supposition Independence: Prob(Si,Yi) = Prob(S
i).P rob(Yi)
Supposition Independence says that the probability that Yi is or would be the
case on the supposition that Si is independent of whether Si is true or not. It is
much more compelling than the other two independence conditions and arguably
the characteristic property of evidential supposition. In this context, however, its
main significance lies in the following claim, which we prove in the appendix as
Theorem 7.
Probability Equivalence Theorem: Assume Centring. Then Fact-Counterfact
Independence is equivalent to the conjunction of Supposition Independence
and Counterfact Independence.
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We will show in the section after the next that Fact-Counterfact Independence
is also a consequence of EU theory. But the principle is implausibly strong as a
rationality constraint. Suppose again that I know that a prize is contained in one
and only one of two boxes. Then if I pick one of them and discover that there
is no prize in it, I can be sure that if I had picked the other box then I would
have got the prize. So what is the case, namely that the prize is not in the box
I picked, determines what would have been case had I picked the other one.
It seems clear then that counterfactual reasoning does not typically satisfy
Fact-Counterfact Independence; nor does rationality require that it be satisfied.
In fact, certain theories of rational decision-making assume that rational agents
violate it. In game theory with imperfect information, for instance, which con-
cerns rational strategic decision-making for agents who are uncertain about what
moves other ‘players’ have already made, it is standardly assumed that a rational
strategy for figuring out whether a player P has made a particular move M, is to
ask oneself what would happen if P did not make that move. If it turns out that
not making move M would lead to a bad outcome for P, then that might reason-
ably lead one to increase one’s credence in the proposition that P has made move
M. Nonetheless, as we shall see, Fact-Counterfact Independence is implied by EU
theory as we reconstruct it within a proposition framework (but not by Jeffrey’s
weaker theory). We take it that a good theory of practical rationality should, if
possible, avoid such implausible epistemic implications. Moreover, it seems partic-
ularly problematic if a theory of rational individual decision-making contradicts
an assumption that is standardly made in the theory of rational strategic decision-
making. Hence, this result casts doubt on the claim that expected utility theory is
our best theory of practical rationality.
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5.2 Ethical Actualism
An additive desirability function is not yet an expected utility. An expected util-
ity is an additive desirability that satisfies a version of a principle common to
many decision theories and that we have termed ethical actualism. The basic
intuition behind this principle is that only the actual world matters, so that the
desirability of combinations of facts and counterfacts should depend only on the
desirability of the facts. In this section we consider several formulations of this
principle and clarify its relationship to separability.
One way of expressing ethical actualism more formally is as follows:
World Actualism: u(〈w,w1, ..., wn〉) = u(w)
World Actualism says that the desirability that w is the actual world and that
the wi worlds would be the case if the Ai were, depends only on the desirability
of w. In other words, once it has been established what world is the actual one,
then it should be a matter of indifference what the counteractual worlds are. The
applicability of World Actualism rests on the possibility of giving a complete de-
scription of everything that matters. If we were able to do so, then any way in
which the counterfacts mattered to us in the actual world could be registered in
the description we give of that world. It is not that the counterfacts themselves
must be written into the descriptions of worlds—this would lead to contradiction
when the counterfacts specified in the description of a world differed from those in
counteractual worlds—but that any way in which these counterfacts bear on our
evaluation of the facts must be specified. For instance, suppose the desirability
of dining at home is sensitive to how good a meal one would have had, had one
dined out at the local restaurant, because the fact that one would have had a bet-
ter meal at the restaurant causes one to regret eating at home and the fact that
one would have had a worse meal makes one appreciate the home cooked meal all
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the more. Then these facts—the regret or the appreciation one experiences in the
light of the counterfacts—must be built into the description of the actual world if
World Actualism is to obtain.
The problem with the condition of World Actualism is therefore that it might
hold for one specification of the possible worlds, but not for a model in which they
are specified more coarsely. So we should not think of it as condition that ap-
plies to every model of counterfactual possibility, but rather as a methodological
principle: one which requires contingencies to be sufficiently finely individuated
for World Actualism to hold within the model. This principle is one that many
decision theorists seem to endorse. For instance, Broome ([1991]) recommends
just such a strategy of fine individuation as a way of avoiding Allais’ and Dia-
mond’s putative counterexamples to the separability of rational preference. In a
nutshell his claim is that if there is some property of the outcomes of a decision
that makes it rational to value an outcome differently depending on whether it
has the property or not, then the outcomes should be individuated in accordance
with that property.
Contrary to what appears to be common view, however, imposing World Ac-
tualism on a model by appropriate individuation of prospects does not suffice to
ensure the additive separability of desirabilities. For, as we have already seen, ad-
ditive separability requires that counterfacts under mutually exclusive supposi-
tions be probabilistically independent. But World Actualism alone does not imply
anything about the probabilistic relations between the counterfacts. So the ques-
tion of whether rationality requires expected utility maximisation is not settled by
the question of whether World Actualism is or is not a reasonable condition.
A much stronger and partition-independent version of ethical actualism – the
quantitative analogue of the condition we termed Preference Actualism – takes us
much closer to what is required for desirabilities to be expected utilities. Let S be
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a set of suppositions and suppose that X ∩ Si = ∅. Then consider:
Prospect Actualism: Des(X, Yi) = Des(X)
Prospect Actualism says that the desirability that X is the case and that the
Yi would be on the contrary-to-fact supposition that S
i, depends only on the de-
sirability that X. Or to put it slightly differently, once it is given that X then it
does not matter what would be the case under any supposition inconsistent with
the truth of X.
Although Prospect Actualism expresses a similar idea to World Actualism, the
relationship between them is quite complicated. Given Centring, Prospect Ac-
tualism implies World Actualism, but the converse is not true. In fact, Prospect
Actualism only follows from World Actualism in conjunction with the assumption
that the facts are stochastically independent of the strict counterfacts, a condition
we previously formalised as Fact-Counterfact Independence. (This claim is proven
in the appendix as Theorem 11.)
Prospect Actualism substantially constrains how we may value outcomes. Sup-
pose for instance you have to choose between two restaurants. You go to restau-
rant A and are served a very poor meal. An acquaintance goes to the other restau-
rant and reports that they were served a very good meal. Are things worse over-
all than they would have been if it had been the case that you would have been
served a poor meal at the other restaurant as well? The issue is not whether your
judgement concerning the meal at restaurant A can depend on what the meal at
restaurant B would have been like—surely it should not—but whether the prospect
of having a poor meal at restaurant A when you would have had a good one at
restaurant B is a worse one than that of having the poor meal at restaurant A
when you would also have had a poor one at restaurant B.
In this case the issue boils down to whether the badness associated with the
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difference between what is the case and what might have been if some other course
of action had been pursued is built into the description of the actual state of af-
fairs. In other cases, the plausibility of Prospect Actualism depends on the infor-
mation contained in the description of the counterfactual circumstances. Suppose,
for instance, that the acquaintance in our example reports that standards of food
hygiene were very poor at the other restaurant. You know they have the same
owner, so you infer that standards will also be poor at the restaurant you chose.
This affects your view about the desirability of your choice. In other words, the
desirability of the prospect of going to restaurant A is not independent of the sup-
position that had you gone to restaurant B you would have found food hygiene
standards to be very poor. So Prospect Actualism will be violated whenever there
are either probabilistic or desirabilistic dependencies between the facts and the
strict counterfacts.
Although Prospect Actualism is a very strong condition, it alone is not suf-
ficient to constrain desirabilities enough for them to be expected utilities. But
jointly with the assumption that the facts are probabilistically independent of the
counterfacts, Prospect Actualism does entail that desirabilities are expected utili-
ties. More formally, as we prove in the appendix as Theorem 21:
First Sufficiency Theorem: Assume Centring. If Des is a desirability repre-
sentation of a preference relation % that satisfies Fact-Counterfact Indepen-
dence and Prospect Actualism, then Des is an expected utility representa-
tion of %.
5.3 Expected utility, Separability and Ethical Actualism
We are now in a position to make precise our earlier claim that separability and
ethical actualism are independent, necessary conditions for expected utility max-
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imisation. Let’s take each aspect in turn. First, as we prove in the appendix as
Theorems 15 and 18, strong forms of both separability and ethical actualism are
required for expected utility maximisation. More exactly:
Necessity Theorem: Assume Centring. If Des is an expected utility representa-
tion of the preference relation %, then Des satisfies Counterfact Separability,
Prospect Actualism, Fact-Counterfact Independence and Counterfact Inde-
pendence.
The Necessity Theorem is surprisingly strong and forcefully demonstrates just
how much more demanding the requirement that agents maximise expected util-
ity is than the requirement that they maximise desirability. We consider it highly
implausible that failure to satisfy all four conditions entails irrationality on the
part of an agent. Hence we are doubtful that rationality requires us to maximise
expected utility.
Second, as we noted earlier on, ethical actualism and separability are based on
different, though consistent, intuitions. The former expresses the idea that only
what actually happens matters, while the latter expresses the idea that the desir-
ability of orthogonal counterfacts are independent of each other’s truth. It is not
difficult to see that the counterfacts can be separable even if ethical actualism is
false. To see this again, consider the set of prospects displayed below and suppose
you think that the counterfacts do matter. Specifically, suppose that were E not
the case then you would prefer BOB rather than ANN , in violation of ethical
actualism. So you prefer L1 to LA (in virtue of the former dominating the lat-
ter) even when you know that E. Nonetheless you regard the outcomes under E
and ¬E as separable because your preference for BOB over ANN were it the case
that ¬E is not affected by whether BOB or ANN would be the case if E. Hence
LB  L2.
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E ¬E
L1 ANN BOB
LA ANN ANN
LB BOB BOB
L2 BOB ANN
This example shows that satisfaction of ethical actualism is not necessary for
separability. On the other hand, it might seem that ethical actualism should be
sufficient for separability since if the counterfacts don’t matter, then trivially they
will be desirabilistically independent of one another (they won’t matter whatever
orthogonal counterfacts hold). But this intuition is false. Even if ethical actual-
ism is true, the counterfacts can matter because they can be informative about
what the facts are. If for instance I don’t know which box contains the prize, then
I will, regardless of whether I am an actualist or not, care about whether or not
it is true that if I were to open one of them I would find the prize, since learning
this counterfact enables me to infer where the prize is.
What this example brings out is the possibility that the counterfacts mat-
ter because of probabilistic dependencies between facts and counterfacts. So one
might hypothesise that when the counterfacts are probabilistically independent of
the facts, then ethical actualism should imply separability. It turns out that this
is true. More precisely, provided Centring holds, Prospect Actualism and Fact-
Counterfact Independence jointly imply Counterfact Separability (we prove this in
the appendix as Theorem 13).
We have already observed that separability is not sufficient for ethical actu-
alism. But Prospect Actualism, the strong form of ethical actualism required by
expected utility theory, is a consequence of separability together with the follow-
ing, weaker form of ethical actualism:
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Restricted Actualism: Des(S¯i,Yi) = Des(S¯
i)
Restricted Actualism says that it does not matter that Yi would be the case
under the supposition that Si, given that Si is false. Or to put it slightly differ-
ently, given that Si is not the case, it is a matter of indifference what would be
the case if it were. Restricted Actualism, like Prospect Actualism, is a partition-
independent condition on evaluative attitudes, but it is quite a bit weaker than
the latter. While Prospect Actualism clearly implies Restricted Actualism, the
latter only implies Prospect Actualism when the counterfacts are probabilistically
and desirabilistically independent of each other. More formally, as we prove in the
appendix as Theorem 14, given Centring, Counterfact Separability and Restricted
Actualism imply Prospect Actualism.
In virtue of the First Sufficiency theorem, we can now infer a second set of suf-
ficient conditions for a desirability function to be an expected utility, by drawing
on the Probabilistic Equivalence Theorem and the fact that Counterfact Separa-
bility implies Counterfact Independence. For then it follows, as we prove in the
appendix as Theorem 20, that:
Second Sufficiency Theorem: Assume Centring. If Des is a Jeffrey representa-
tion of preference relation % that satisfies Counterfact Separability, Supposi-
tion Independence and Restricted Actualism, then Des is an expected utility
representation of %.
This second set of sufficient conditions is perhaps the more illuminating of
the two since the dual dependence of expected utility theory on separability and
ethical actualism is more transparent, as is the need for a distinct independence
condition relating suppositions to beliefs about counterfacts under these supposi-
tions. On the other hand, it somewhat obscures how demanding the probabilistic
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independence conditions are on expected utility maximisation. So to finish, let us
bring our various results together into a single statement relating expected utility
theory and the two pairs of conditions on desirability and probability that have
been discussed. It follows from the Necessity Theorem and the two Sufficiency
Theorems that:
EU Equivalence Theorem: Let (Des, Prob) be a Jeffrey representation of a
preference relation on a centred Suppositional Algebra. Then the following
are equivalent:
1. Des is an expected utility
2. Des satisfies Prospect Actualism and Prob satisfies Fact-Counterfact
Independence
3. Des satisfies both Counterfact Separability and Restricted Actualism
and Prob satisfies Supposition Independence
6 Concluding Remarks
We have seen that it is possible, when armed with an appropriate semantics, to
extend Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory to counterfactual propositions. By do-
ing so, one makes it possible to represent two preference patterns – those of Al-
lais and Diamond—that have discomforted decision theorists for decades, and to
rationalise them in terms of desirability maximisation. We have also seen that
when we add the conditions necessary for an expected utility representation to
this framework, we can no longer represent these intuitively rational preferences.
Furthermore, the added postulates imply restrictions on the agent’s beliefs and
desires that have little plausibility as rationality constraints. On the face of it,
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this seriously undermines EU theory’s claim to be the correct theory of practical
rationality.
It might nonetheless be objected that this conclusion depends on the pre-
cise characterisation of EU theory given in this paper, and in particular on our
partition-invariant formulation of it.This is only half-true. Restricting expected
utility maximisation to prospects 〈Y1,...,Yn〉 such that the Yi are maximally spe-
cific will not invalidate our results, only restrict their scope. But this alternative
characterisation of EU theory still faces the following problem: It requires that
maximally specific counterfacts under disjoint suppositions be both desirabilis-
tically and probabilistically independent of each other and of the facts, which is
not plausible as a requirement of rationality. It is true that it has already been
recognised that Savage’s EU theory does not apply in circumstances in which the
states of the world are not probabilistically independent of the acts. But grant-
ing this restriction still falls far short of recognising that his theory does not apply
whenever there are desirabilistic dependencies between the facts and the counter-
facts. And to restrict application of expect utility theory to cases when there are
no such dependencies would render it inapplicable in the circumstances imagined
by Allais and Diamond. Either way, the claim that it provides a general theory of
practical rationality cannot be sustained.
7 Appendix: Definitions and Proofs
7.1 Jeffrey representations
In this first section we present some useful results relating to Jeffrey representa-
tions of preferences on Boolean algebras. Let 〈Ω,⊆,W,∅〉 be a complete, atomless
Boolean algebra of propositions with upper bound W and lower bound ∅ and let
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% be a preference relation on Ω. A pair of functions (Des, Prob) is a Jeffrey rep-
resentation of % just in case Prob is a probability function on Ω and Des a desir-
ability function on Ω′ = Ω − {∅} such that for all α, β ∈ Ω′, Des(α) ≥ Des(β) ⇔
α % β. Recall that a desirability function on Ω′ is a real-valued function such that
for all α, β ∈ Ω′:
V1 (Normality): Des(W) = 0
V2 (Desirability): If α ∩ β = ∅, then:
Des(α ∪ β) = Des(α).P rob(α) +Des(β).P rob(β)
Prob(α ∪ β)
Recall also the definitions of conditional probability and desirability.
Conditional Probability: If Prob(α) 6= 0 :
Prob(β|α) := Prob(α ∩ β)
Prob(α)
Conditional Desirability: If Prob(α ∩ β) 6= 0 :
Des(β|α) := Des(α ∩ β)−Des(α)
Lemma 2 Let (Des, Prob) be a Jeffrey representation of % . Then:
1. Des(α).P rob(α) = −Des(α¯).P rob(α¯)
2. Prob(α)
Prob(α¯)
= −Des(α¯)
Des(α)
3. If Des(α|β) = Des(α) and Des(α¯|β) = Des(α), then Prob(α|β) = Prob(α)
and Prob(α¯|β) = Prob(α)
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Proof. Given that α ∪ α¯ = >, it follows by the axioms of Desirability and Nor-
mality, that:
Des(>) = Des(α).P rob(α) +Des(α¯).P rob(α¯) = 0
Hence Des(α).P rob(α) = −Des(α¯).P rob(α¯). But this is the case:
⇔ Des(α).P rob(α)
Prob(α¯)
= −Des(α¯)
⇔ Prob(α)
Prob(α¯)
= −Des(α¯)
Des(α)
Assume that Des(α|β) = Des(α) and Des(α¯|β) = Des(α¯). Then by application of
the above and from the fact that Des(·|β) is a desirability function:
Prob(α|β)
Prob(α¯|β) = −
Des(α¯|β)
Des(α|β)
= −Des(α¯)
Des(α)
=
Prob(α)
Prob(α¯)
Hence Prob(α|β) = Prob(α) and Prob(α¯|β) = Prob(α¯).
7.2 Suppositional algebras
Hereafter our results pertain to Suppositional Algebras of propositions, where the
latter are construed as sets of n-tuples of worlds. Let S = 〈W,Ω,S, f,z,Γ〉 be
a suppositional algebra with W a set of possible worlds, Ω a Boolean algebra of
subsets of W, S = {Si} ⊆ Ω a set of n suppositions, f a selection function from
W×S to Ω, z the set of n-tuples of worlds induced by f , and Γ a Boolean algebra
of subsets of z (the set of all propositions). If f satisfies Centring then we say
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that S is a centered Suppositional Algebra.
Lemma 3 Assume that S is a centered Suppositional Algebra. Let X ⊆ Si. Then
(X, Y1,...,Yn) =(X ∩ Yi,
⋂
j 6=iYj).
Proof. (X, Y1,...,Yn) = {〈w0, w1, ..., wn〉 : w0 ∈ X and wj ∈ Yj}. Since X ⊆ Si, it
follows from Centring that 〈w0, w1, ..., wn〉 ∈ (X, Y1,...,Yn) ⇔ wi = w0. So:
(X,Y1,...,Yn) = {〈w0, w1, ..., wn〉 : w0 ∈ X ∩ Yi and for all j, wj ∈ Yj}
= (X ∩ Yi,Y1,...,Si,...,Yn)
= (X ∩ Yi,
⋂
j 6=i
Yj)
7.2.1 Probability conditions
In this section we prove a number of results concerning the relation between three
different conditions of probabilistic independence. Throughout let S = {Si} be a
set of disjoint suppositions and Xi ⊆Si. Then consider:
Supposition Independence: Prob(Si,Xi) = Prob(S
i).P rob(Xi)
Fact-Counterfact Independence: If X ∩ Sj = ∅, then:
Prob(X,Yj) = Prob(X).P rob(Yj)
Counterfact Independence: If {Si}ni=1 is a set of n disjoint suppositions, then:
Prob(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∏
i=1
Prob(Yi)
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Theorem 4 Fact-Counterfact Independence implies Supposition Independence.
Proof. Suppose that X⊆Si. Then by Fact-Counterfact Independence, since X ∩
S¯i = ∅, it follows that:
Prob(S¯
i
,Xi) = Prob(S¯
i
).P rob(Xi)
But then Prob(Si,Xi) = Prob(S
i).P rob(Xi).
Theorem 5 Let Xi =X ∩ Si and assume Centring. Then Supposition Indepen-
dence implies that Prob(Xi) = Prob(X|Si).
Proof. Assume Centring. Then:
Prob(Xi | Si) = Prob(S
i,Xi)
Prob(Si)
=
Prob(Si ∩ X)
Prob(Si)
= Prob(X | Si)
But by Theorem 4, Fact-Counterfact Independence implies that Prob(Xi|Si) =
Prob(Xi). Hence Prob(Xi) = Prob(X|Si)
Theorem 6 Let S = {S1, ...Sn} be a set of n disjoint suppositions and suppose
that for all Si,Sj ∈ S, Prob(Xi,Yj) = Prob(Xi).P rob(Yj). Then:
Prob(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
∏n
i=1
Prob(Yi)
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the number n of suppositions in S.
By assumption the claim is true for n = 2, i.e. that Prob(Y1,Y2) = Prob(Y1).P rob(Y2).
Assume true for n = k. Now:
Prob(Y1,...,Yk+1) = Prob(Y1,...,Yk|Yk+1).Prob(Yk+1)
= Prob(Yk+1).
∏k
i=1
Prob(Yi|Yk+1)
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in virtue of the induction hypothesis for n = k and the fact that Prob(·|Yk+1) is
a probability on the space of propositions. But by assumption, Prob(Yi,Yk+1) =
Prob(Yi).P rob(Yi,Yk+1). So Prob(Y1,...,Yn) =
∏k+1
i=1 Prob(Yi).
Theorem 7 (Probability Equivalence) Assume Centring. Then Counter-
fact Independence and Supposition Independence are jointly equivalent to Fact-
Counterfact Independence.
Proof. Assume Centring, Counterfact Independence and Supposition Indepen-
dence. Suppose that Sj = W - Si, Xi = S
i∩ X = X and Yj = Sj∩ Y = Y . It fol-
lows by Centring and then Counterfact Independence that:
Prob(X,Yj) = Prob(S
i∩X, Yj)
= Prob(Si, Xi, Yj)
= Prob(Xi, Yj|Si).P rob(Si)
= Prob(Xi|Si).P rob(Yj|Si).P rob(Si)
But by Supposition Independence:
Prob(Yj|Si) = Prob(Yj|S¯j) = Prob(Yj)
Hence:
Prob(X,Yj) = Prob(Xi|Si).P rob(Yj).P rob(Si)
=
Prob(Si,Xi)
Prob(Si)
.P rob(Yj).P rob(S
i)
= Prob(Si∩X).P rob(Yj)
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in virtue of Centring. So Prob(X,Yj) = Prob(S
i∩X).P rob(Yj) = Prob(X).P rob(Yj),
in accordance with Fact-Counterfact Independence.
Now assume Fact-Counterfact Independence. Supposition Independence fol-
lows by Theorem 4. Now for all Si and Sj such that Si∩ Sj = ∅:
Prob(Si ∪ Sj,Xi,Yj) = Prob(Si, Xi, Yj) + Prob(Sj, Xi, Yj)
But by Lemma 3, Centring implies that:
Prob(Si, Xi, Yj) = Prob(S
i ∩ X, Yj)
Prob(Sj, Xi, Yj) = Prob(S
j ∩ Y, Xi)
And by Fact-Counterfact Independence:
Prob(Si ∩ X, Yj) = Prob(Si ∩ X).P rob(Yj)
Prob(Sj ∩ Y, Xi) = Prob(Sj ∩ Y).P rob(Xi)
Prob(Si ∪ Sj, Xi, Yj) = Prob(Si ∪ Sj).P rob(Xi, Yj)
So:
Prob(Xi,Yj) =
Prob(Si ∩ X).P rob(Yj) + Prob(Sj ∩ Y).P rob(Xi)
Prob(Si ∪ Sj)
But by Theorem 5, it follows from Supposition Independence that:
Prob(Yj) = Prob(Y | Sj)
Prob(Xi) = Prob(X | Si)
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So:
Prob(Xi,Yj) =
Prob(X | Si).P rob(Y | Sj).P rob(Si) + Prob(Y | Sj).P rob(X | Si).P rob(Sj)
Prob(Si ∪ Sj)
= Prob(Y | Sj).P rob(X | Si)
= Prob(Xi).P rob(Yj)
But by Theorem 6, if Prob(Xi,Yj) = Prob(Xi).P rob(Yj) for all such Xi and Yj,
then Prob(Y1,...,Yn) =
∏n
i=1 Prob(Yi), in accordance with Fact-Counterfact Inde-
pendence. We conclude that, given Centring, Counterfact Independence and Sup-
position Independence are jointly equivalent to Fact-Counterfact Independence.
Corollary 8 Let X ∩Yi = ∅. Assume Centring. Then Fact-Counterfact Indepen-
dence implies that:
Prob(X,Y1,...,Yn) = Prob(X).
∏n
i=1
Prob(Yi)
Proof. By the definition of conditional probability and Fact-Counterfact Indepen-
dence:
Prob(X,Yi,...,Yj) = Prob(X,Y1|Y2...,Yn).P rob(Y2...,Yn)
= Prob(X|Y2...,Yn).P rob(Y1|Y2...,Yn).P rob(Y2...,Yn)
= Prob(X,Y2...,Yn).P rob(Y1)
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by Theorem 6. Hence, by repeating the argument:
Prob(X,Yi,...,Yj) = Prob(X,Y2|Y3...,Yn).P rob(Y3...,Yn)
= Prob(X|Y3...,Yn).P rob(Y2|Y3...,Yn).P rob(Y3...,Yn)
= Prob(X,Y3...,Yn).P rob(Y1).P rob(Y2)
...
= Prob(X).
∏n
i=1
Prob(Yi)
7.2.2 Desirability-probability results
In this section we prove a number of results concerning the relation between three
different conditions on desirabilities and the probabilistic independence conditions
studied in the last section. As before, throughout let S = {Si} be a set of disjoint
suppositions and Yi ⊆Si. Then consider:
Restricted Actualism: Des(S¯i,Yi) = Des(S¯
i)
Prospect Actualism: If X ∩ Si = ∅, then:
Des(X,Yi) = Des(X)
Counterfact Separability: If
⋂
Si = ∅, then:
Des(〈Y1, ...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Yi)
Theorem 9 Counterfact Separability implies Counterfact Independence.
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Proof. Let S ={Si}ni=1 be a set of n disjoint suppositions, Si any other suppo-
sition and Yi any corresponding counterfactual proposition. We need to consider
two cases separately. First let Yj be any proposition such that Des(Yj) 6= Des(Y¯j)
(by the non-triviality assumption, such a Yj exists). Then by Counterfact Separa-
bility and the fact that (Yi,Yj) = 〈W, (S1)1, ...,Yi,Yj, ..., (Sn)n):
Des(Yi,Yj) = Des(Yi) +Des(Yj) +
∑
k 6=i,j
Des((Sk)k)
Des(Yi,Y¯j) = Des(Yi) +Des(Y¯j) +
∑
k 6=i,j
Des((Sk)k)
But since (Sk)k = z, it follows by Normality that Des((Sk)k) = 0. So Des(Yi,
Yj) = Des(Yi) + Des(Yj) and Des(Yi, Y¯j) = Des(Yi) + Des(Y¯j). But by the
axiom of desirability:
Des(Yi) = Des(Yi,Yj).P rob(Yj|Yi) +Des(Yi,Y¯j).P rob(Y¯j|Yi)
= [Des(Yi) +Des(Yj)].P rob(Yj|Yi) + [Des(Yi) +Des(Y¯j)].P rob(Y¯j|Yi)
= Des(Yi) +Des(Yj).P rob(Yj|Yi) +Des(Y¯j).P rob(Y¯j|Yi)
But this can hold only if:
Des(Yj).P rob(Yj|Yi)+Des(Y¯j).P rob(Y¯j|Yi) = 0 = Des(Yj).P rob(Yj)+Des(Y¯j).P rob(Y¯j)
by Lemma 2. By assumption Des(Yj) 6= Des(Y¯j). So Prob(Yj|Yi) = Prob(Yj) and
hence Prob(Yi,Yj) = Prob(Yi).P rob(Yj).
Now let Xj be any proposition such that Des(Xj) = Des(X¯j). Let Yj any
proposition such that Des(Yj) 6= Des(Y¯j) and Xj∩ Yj = ∅. Note that it follows
from the axiom of deirability that Des(Xj∪ Yj) ≥6= Des(X¯j∩ Y¯j). Then it follows
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from above that:
Prob(Yi, Xj ∪ Yj) = Prob(Yi).P rob(Xj ∪ Yj)
Prob(Yi, Yj) = Prob(Yi).P rob(Yj)
But:
Prob(Yi, Xj ∪ Yj) = Prob(Yi, Xj) + Prob(Yi, Yj)
= Prob(Yi, Xj) + Prob(Yi).P rob(Yj)
Prob(Yi).P rob(Xj ∪ Yj) = Prob(Yi).P rob(Xj) + Prob(Yi).P rob(Yj)
It follows that Prob(Yi,Xj) = Prob(Yi).P rob(Xj). Counterfact Independence then
follows from Theorem 6.
Theorem 10 Assume Centring. Then Restricted Actualism and Supposition In-
dependence imply that Des(Yi) = [Des(S
i∩Y)−Des(Si)].P rob(Si).
Proof. By the axiom of desirability:
Des(Yi) = Des(S
i,Yi).P rob(S
i|Yi) +Des(S¯i,Yi).P rob(S¯i|Yi)
= Des(Si ∩ Y).P rob(Si|Yi) +Des(S¯i).P rob(S¯i|Yi)
in virtue of Centring and Restricted Actualism. And by Supposition Independence
Prob(Si|Yi) = Prob(Si) = Prob(S¯i|Yi). Hence
Des(Yi) = Des(S
i ∩ Y).P rob(Si) +Des(S¯i).P rob(S¯i)
= Des(Si ∩ Y).P rob(Si)−Des(Si)].P rob(Si)
by Lemma 2. Hence Des(Yi) = [Des(S
i∩Y)−Des(Si)].P rob(Si).
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Theorem 11 Assume Centring. Then World Actualism and Fact-Counterfact
Independence imply Prospect Actualism.
Proof. Let S = {Si}ni=1 be a set of n disjoint suppositions and suppose that X
⊆Si∗ . By Centring, (X, Y1,..., Yn) = (X, (
⋂
i 6=i∗Yi)) and by construction:
Des(X,Y1,...,Yn).P rob(X,Y1,...,Yn) =
∑
ωj∈(X,Y1,...,Yn)
u(〈w0, w1, ..., wn〉j).p(〈w0, w1, ..., wn〉j)
=
∑
ωj
u((w0)j).p(〈w0, w1, ..., wn〉j)
by World Actualism. But by Centring and Fact-Counterfact Independence Prob(X,
Y1,..., Yn) = Prob(X,
⋂
i 6=i∗Yi) = Prob(X).P rob(
⋂
i 6=i∗Yi) and p(〈w0, w1, ..., wn〉) =
p(w0).p(
⋂
i 6=i∗ wi). So:
∑
ωj
u((w0)j).p(〈w0, w1, ..., wn〉j) =
∑
w0∈X
u(w0).p(w0)[
∑
〈w1,...wn〉∈(Y1,...,Yn)
p(
⋂
i 6=i∗
wi)]
=
∑
w0∈X
u(w0).p(w0).P rob(
⋂
i 6=i∗
Yi)
Hence:
Des(X,Y1,...,Yn).P rob(X) =
∑
w0∈X
u(w0).p(w0)
= Des(X).P rob(X)
It follows that Des(X,Y1,...,Yn) = Des(X) in accordance with Prospect Actual-
ism.
Theorem 12 Suppose that X ∩(⋃Si ∈ S) = ∅. Then Prospect Actualism implies
that Des(X,Y1,...,Yn) = Des(X).
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Proof. By repeated applications of the definition of conditional desirability and
Prospect Actualism:
Des(〈X,Y1,...,Yn〉) = Des(X,Y1 | Y2,...,Yn) +Des(Y2,...,Yn)
= Des(X | Y2,...,Yn) +Des(Y2,...,Yn)
= Des(X,Y2,...,Yn)
= Des(X,Y2 | Y3,...,Yn) +Des(Y3,...,Yn)
...
= Des(X,Yn)
= Des(X)
Theorem 13 Assume Centring. Then Fact-Counterfact Independence and Prospect
Actualism imply Counterfact Separability.
Proof. By the axiom of desirability and then Lemma 11, given Centring:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Si, Y1,...,Yn).P rob(S
i | 〈Y1,...,Yn〉)
=
n∑
i=1
Des(Si ∩ Yi,
⋂
j 6=i
(Yj)).P rob(S
i | 〈Y1,...,Yn〉)
=
n∑
i=1
Des(Si ∩ Yi).P rob(Si | 〈Y1,...,Yn〉)
in virtue of Prospect Actualism. Now by Corollary 8, given Centring, Fact-Counterfact
Independence implies that:
Prob(Si | 〈Y1,...,Yn〉) = Prob(Si)
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It follows that:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Si ∩ Yi).P rob(Si)
=
n∑
i=1
Des(Si ∩ Yi).P rob(Si)−
n∑
i=1
Des(Si).P rob(Si)
=
n∑
i=1
[Des(Si ∩ Yi)−Des(Si)].P rob(Si)
in virtue of the fact that by V1 and V2,
∑n
i=1Des(S
i).P rob(Si) = 0. In particular:
Des(Yi) = Des(〈S1,...,Yi,...,Sn〉)
= [Des(Si ∩ Yi)−Des(Si)].P rob(Si) +
∑
j 6=i
[Des(Sj)−Des(Sj)].P rob(Sj)
= [Des(Si ∩ Yi)−Des(Si)].P rob(Si)
Hence Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
∑n
i=1Des(Yi).
Theorem 14 Given Centring, Counterfact Separability and Restricted Actualism
imply Prospect Actualism.
Proof. Let Xi = X ∩ Si and suppose Sj = W - Si. Then by Lemma 3, given Cen-
tring, Des(Si, Xi,Yj) = Des(S
i∩ X,Yj). But by the definition of conditional desir-
ability and Counterfact Separability:
Des(Si, Xi,Yj) = Des(Xi,Yj|Si) +Des(Si)
= Des(Xi|Si) +Des(Yj|Si) +Des(Si)
= Des(Si, Xi) +Des(S
i, Yj)−Des(Si)
= Des(Si ∩ X) +Des(Si)−Des(Si)
= Des(Si ∩ X)
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in virtue of Restricted Actualism and Centring. Hence Des(Si∩ X,Yj) = Des(Si∩
X) in accordance with Prospect Actualism.
7.3 Characterisation results for expected utility
Throughout we assume that (Prob,Des) is Jeffrey representation of preferences
defined on a Centered suppositional algebra Γ of propositions. Let S = {Si} be
a set of disjoint suppositions and Yi ⊆Si. Recall that a desirability function Des
defined on a centred suppositional algebra of propositions is an expected utility on
this algebra iff:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Yi|Si).P rob(Si)
7.3.1 Necessity results
Theorem 15 Let Des be an expected utility. Then:
1. Des(Yi) = [Des(S
i∩Yi)−Des(Si)].P rob(Si)
2. Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
∑n
i=1Des(Yi)
Proof. By definition if Des is an expected utility, then:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Yi|Si).P rob(Si)
So in particular, since Yi = 〈S1,...,Yi...,Sn〉 = 〈Yi,
⋂
j 6=iS
j〉, it follows that:
Des(Yi) = Des(Yi|Si).P rob(Si) +
∑
j 6=i
Des(Sj|Sj).P rob(Sj)
= Des(Yi|Si).P rob(Si)
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since Des(Sj|Sj) = 0. But by the definition of conditional desirability:
Des(Yi | Si) = Des(Si ∩ Yi)−Des(Si)
So Des(Yi) = [Des(S
i∩Yi)−Des(Si)].P rob(Si). But then.
n∑
i=1
Des(Yi) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Yi|Si).P rob(Si) = Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉)
Hence:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Yi)
Theorem 16 Let Des be an expected utility. Then Prob satisfies Supposition In-
dependence.
Proof. Let Xi = S
i ∩ X. By the axioms of normality and desirability:
Prob(Xi) =
Des(X¯i)
Des(X¯i)−Des(Xi)
=
Des(Si ∩ X¯).P rob(Si)−Des(Si).P rob(Si)
Des(Si ∩ X¯).P rob(Si) +Des(Si ∩ X).P rob(Si)
by Theorem 15(1) and in virtue of the fact that Des is an expected utility. But
then by application of the axiom of desirability to Des(Si).P rob(Si):
Prob(Xi) =
Des(Si ∩ X¯).P rob(Si)−Des(Si ∩ X).P rob(Si ∩ X)−Des(Si ∩ X¯).P rob(Si ∩ X¯)
Prob(Si).[Des(Si ∩ X¯) +Des(Si ∩ X)]
=
Des(Si ∩ X¯).P rob(Si ∩ X)−Des(Si ∩ X).P rob(Si ∩ X)
Prob(Si).[Des(Si ∩ X¯) +Des(Si ∩ X)]
=
Prob(Si ∩ X).[Des(Si ∩ X¯) +Des(Si ∩ X)]
Prob(Si).[Des(Si ∩ X¯) +Des(Si ∩ X)]
=
Prob(Si,Xi)
Prob(Si)
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Hence Prob(Si,Xi) = Prob(Xi).P rob(S
i) in accordance with Supposition Indepen-
dence.
Corollary 17 If Des is an expected utility then Des satisfies Counterfact Inde-
pendence and Fact-Counterfact Independence.
Proof. By Theorem 15 Des satisfies Counterfact Separability and by Theorem
9, Counterfact Separability implies Counterfact Independence. Similarly, by The-
orem 16, Des satisfies Supposition Independence and by Theorem 10, Counter-
fact Independence and Supposition Independence are jointly equivalent to Fact-
Counterfact Independence.
Theorem 18 Let Des be an expected utility. Then Des satisfies Restricted Actu-
alism.
Proof. By Theorem 16, Prob satisfies Supposition Independence. So Prob(Si|Yi) =
Prob(Si) and by the axiom of desirability:
Des(Yi) = Des(S
i,Yi).P rob(S
i|Yi) +Des(Si,Yi).P rob(Si|Yi)
= Des(Si ∩ Yi).P rob(Si) +Des(Si,Yi).P rob(Si)
by Lemma 3, given Centring. But by Theorem 15, Des(Yi) = (Des(S
i∩Yi) −
Des(Si)).P rob(Si). Hence by Lemma 2, Des(Yi) = Des(S
i∩Yi).P rob(Si)+Des(Si).P rob(Si).
So, in accordance with Restricted Actualism:
Des(S¯
i
,Yi) = Des(S¯
i
)
Corollary 19 Let Des be an expected utility. Then Des satisfies Prospect Actual-
ism.
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Proof. By Theorem 15, Des satisfies Counterfact Separability and by Theorem
18, it satisfies Restricted Actualism. So by Theorem 14 it satisfied Prospect Actu-
alism.
7.3.2 Sufficiency results
Theorem 20 Assume that Des satisfies Counterfact Separability and Restricted
Actualism and that Prob satisfies Supposition Independence. Then Des is an ex-
pected utility.
Proof. Let Yi = Y ∩ Si. By Counterfact Separability:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Yi)
But by Theorem 10, Restricted Actualism and Supposition Independence imply
that Des(Yi) = [Des(S
i∩Yi)−Des(Si)].P rob(Si). Hence:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
[Des(Si ∩ Yi)−Des(Si)].P rob(Si)
=
n∑
i=1
Des(Si ∩ Yi).P rob(Si)−
n∑
i=1
Des(Si).P rob(Si)
=
n∑
i=1
Des(Si ∩ Yi).P rob(Si)
in virtue of the fact that by V1 and V2,
∑n
i=1Des(S
i).P rob(Si) = 0. But by the
definition of conditional desirability:
Des(Yi | Si) = Des(Si ∩ Yi)−Des(Si)
So:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Y | Si).P rob(Si)
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Theorem 21 Assume that Des satisfies Prospect Actualism and that Prob satis-
fies Fact-Counterfact Independence. Then Des is an expected utility.
Proof. Let Yi = Y ∩ Si. By the axiom of desirability and then Lemma 11:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Si, Y1,...,Yn).P rob(S
i | 〈Y1,...,Yn〉)
=
n∑
i=1
Des(Si ∩ Y,
⋂
j 6=i
(Yj)).
P rob(Si ∩ Yi,
⋂
j 6=i(Yj))
Prob(Yi,
⋂
j 6=i(Yj))
Now by Theorem 7, Fact-Counterfact Independence implies Counterfact Indepen-
dence which implies, by Theorem 6, that Prob(Yi|
⋂
j 6=i(Yj)) = Prob(Yi). Sim-
ilarly, by Corollary 8, Fact-Counterfact Independence implies that Prob(Si∩Yi
| ⋂j 6=i(Yj)) = Prob(Si∩Yi). Hence:
Prob(Si ∩ Yi |
⋂
j 6=i(Yj))
Prob(Yi |
⋂
j 6=i(Yj))
=
Prob(Si ∩ Yi)
Prob(Yi)
= Prob(Si | Yi)
Similarly by Theorem 12, Prospect Actualism implies that Des(Si∩Y, ⋂j 6=i(Yj)) =
Des(Si∩Y). So:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Si ∩ Y).P rob(Si | Yi)
But by Theorem 4, Fact-Counterfact Independence implies that Prob(Si |Yi) =
Prob(Si). Hence:
Des(〈Y1,...,Yn〉) =
n∑
i=1
Des(Si ∩ Y).P rob(Si)
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